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Refugee family reunion is a mechanism whereby refugees residing in a safe host-country may 
apply to have their families, typically residing abroad, join them to live and restart their lives 
in safety. This system operates under international and domestic laws which, in relation to 
the United Kingdom (UK), suffers from frequent tensions between the two. The problems exist 
due to the nature of immigration laws and the political dimension to expansion of the rights 
of individuals to enter and live in the UK; the (often) limited cultural, linguistic and 
technological skills of the applicant; and the practical system of applying for family reunion 
which exposes the applicant to a Byzantine procedural and legal process. In sum, this is a 
particularly anti-therapeutic mechanism to provide an individual with their most basic 
human right – the right to a family life. 
 
This paper uses therapeutic jurisprudence as a philosophic approach considering the 
emotional effects of the law. It explores how a more humanitarian direction to judicial 
decision-making and the administration of justice, or alternatively the use of mediation as a 
dispute resolution technique, may provide tangible benefits to applicants and their refugee 
sponsor accessing the legal system in England and Wales.  
 





The law relating to refugee family reunion comprises several sources. The most important of 
these are international obligations, conventions, EU legislation (at least until 31 December 
2020) and national laws. Collectively they provide a framework for refugees’ rights and state 
obligations whilst the refugee resides in the host state. Beginning with international sources 
of obligations on the UK, the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees
1
 and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, these instruments 
establish a framework for international refugee protection.
2
 Importantly, in respect of the 
topic of this paper, ‘[t]he object and purpose of the 1951 Convention implies that its rights 
are in principle extended to the family members of refugees.’
3
 Further, the principle of family 
unity is referred to in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
Handbook.
4
 This does not extend directly to refugee family reunion but does provide, that as 
a minimum, the spouse and children (before reaching the age of majority) of the refugee 
should benefit from the provisions establishing family unity. The European Convention on 
Human Rights similarly ensures for the rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals in the 
Member States, and since 2006 the UK has been bound by the EU Refugee Qualification 
Directive 2004/83/EC.
5
 The Directive, albeit subject to possible disapplication following the 
end of the transitional period, stipulates for the protection of family unity and for reciprocal 
rights to be provided to qualifying family members in relation to State benefits.
6
 These 
provisions mirror those included in Part 11 of the Immigration Rules. The EU Dublin 
Regulation
7
 control state responsibility for determining asylum claims lodged in an EU 
Member State,
8
 and in Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway or Switzerland. The Regulation 
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requires Member States to either maintain the close family members (spouse and children) or 
to bring them together when individuals seek asylum. The Regulation differs somewhat from 
existing national legislation as it extends the right to family reunion of unaccompanied 
minors where this is in the best interests of the child. It also extends the application of the 
right to other relatives beyond the child’s parents or siblings, where these extended family 
members may be in a position to care for the child. One requirement in the Regulations is that 
the extended family members seeking reunification must be legally present in the Member 
State. Asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their application are, for the purposes of the 
Regulation, considered legally present in the Member State. This focus on the child, missing 
in the national Immigration Rules, can be seen most clearly in the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) where, at Article 3(1), obligates signatory States that ‘In 
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration.’ This source of international law, however, has not 
been incorporated into national law in the same way as has been the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), although its relationship to ECHR Article 8, and the overriding 





In respect to the national law governing refugee family reunion, several sources apply and 
impact on the decision-making relevant to refugees. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 
established the provision for asylum support and the creation of the regulatory body which 
campaigns on relevant issues and oversees the appointment of qualified immigration 
advisors.
10
 The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides for rights of appeal 
for refused refugee family reunion applications and the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment 
of Claimants) Act 2004 guides decision-makers on the application of rules regarding issues 
affecting an applicant’s credibility. The Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 
enables the Secretary of State, the Director of Border Revenue and officials designated by 
them to provide for functions relating to immigration, asylum or nationality. It also provides 
for the State’s duties towards children, which, at s. 55, introduces a duty for the safeguarding 
and the promotion of the welfare of children ‘who are in the United Kingdom.’  
 
Beyond those legislative sources noted above, the Refugee or Person in Need of International 
Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, transpose into national law aspects of the 
Refugee Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC. Perhaps most significantly for the purposes of 
this paper and refugee family reunion are the Immigration Rules, Part 11: Asylum which 
outline the procedures for determining asylum claims, the granting of leave to remain and 
rules relating to family reunion (although provisions in Parts 8 and 9 may be relevant in 
certain circumstances). The provisions pertinent to refugee family reunion are: 
 
 paras 319X - 319XB which set out the requirements for leave to enter the UK or to 
remain as the child (and under the age of 18) of a relative who has refugee status or 
humanitarian protection;  
 paras 320 - 322 which establish the grounds on which a refusal of family reunion may 
be made; 
 paras 339A - 339AC and 339BA which establish when the status of ‘refugee’ may be 
revoked or renewed. Similar rules are provided for in paras 339G - 339GD for 
individuals granted humanitarian protection; and 
 paras 352A - 352FJ11 which identify the rules on which the granting of refugee family 
reunion is made. This applies to the spouses and civil partners,
12




 of the refugee and the children (biological, adopted and de facto adopted, 
and dependent children under the age of 18) of the refugee
14
 who are ‘sponsored’ by 
the refugee living in the UK.  
 
The outcome of the decision-making of the Home Office civil servants in Part of the 
Immigration Rules is subject to a strict appeals procedure, made all the more onerous by the 
application of the Immigration Act 2014 s. 15 which reduced access in this regard. An appeal 
may be sought when the decision is in effect to refuse a human right, a protection claim or is 
a decision to revoke protected status. The Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002 s. 
82(1)(b) concerns a refusal of human rights claim which is based on the grounds that the 
decision reached is unlawful in respect of the requirements identified in the Human Rights 
Act 1998 s. 6. The refusal of an application for leave to enter or to remain in the UK on the 
basis of refugee family reunion rules is considered a human rights claim for the purposes of 
this section of the Act. 
 
Thus, the families of refugees and individuals granted humanitarian protection status are 
entitled, as a matter of international law, to apply to be reunited with their spouse or parent 
residing in the UK. This system is known as refugee family reunion and enables the refugee, 
via an application process, to be reunited in the new ‘safe’ country with their nuclear and pre-
flight family members. For the purposes of refugee family reunion, the recognised ‘family’ 
refers to spouses and civil partners, unmarried / same sex partners, and the (biological, 
adopted and de facto adopted) children (under the age of 18) of the refugee.  
 
The process requires the submission of the application, including a bundle of documentary 
evidence supporting the assertion of the family ties before the refugee left their home country. 
The applicants are the family members living away from the refugee (who is known as the 
sponsor in the UK application process). They are required to demonstrate a subsisting 
relationship following the separation of the family, and (advisably) a statement from the 
applicant explaining any gaps in the available evidence or explanations of the family 
circumstances which may not have been included in the application form. This completed and 
submitted application is assessed and verified by a member of the UK civil service (as part of 
the UK’s Home Office government department). This individual is called an Entry Clearance 
Officer (ECO) and it is their job to assess and determine whether the application for refugee 
family reunion should be approved or refused. Where refused, the decision is reviewed by an 
Entry Clearance Manager (ECM). Having confirmed that the application has not satisfied the 
tests for refugee family reunion, a ‘reasons for refusal’ letter is sent to the refugee’s applicant 
family members. The applicant, often actioned through their sponsor based in the UK, is 
entitled to appeal the decision of the Home Office and this is heard in the First-tier Tribunal 
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) which is part of HM Courts & Tribunals Service. 
 
It was in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 where, 
complementing the austerity measures introduced by the coalition government, a decision 
was made to remove the legal aid previously made available to refugees to complete their 
application for family reunification.  For the government, completing the application was a 
straightforward process, although this was not a universally accepted position
15
 and several 
commentators considered it to be a system fraught with practical impediments which work to 





 limited technology skills; and differences in approach to common 
Western activities such as chronicling, collecting and maintaining details of births, deaths and 
weddings exist to disrupt the process of making the application with sufficient supporting 
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documentary evidence. All refugees exhibit some signs of post-traumatic stress
18
 and this 
trauma is exacerbated in poverty,
19
 problems in accessing services,
20
 in the resultant feelings 
surrounding the processing of immigration claims,
21
 and the continued uncertainty 
surrounding the refugee and their family’s future treatment.
22
 These legal and non-legal 
issues have significant psychological and anti-therapeutic effects on the parties concerned. 
The resolution to problems which have a justiciable solution has evolved following reviews 
and public criticism. Lord Woolf, who in 1996 produced the Access to Justice report 
identifying comprehensive law approaches in legal systems which resulted in a changing 
philosophy
23
 to be applied in these jurisdictions
24
 including criminal law, family law, and 
employment. This resulted in the formation of creative problem-solving courts, holistic 
justice, preventive law and restorative justice. These additions are unique in their aims and 
scope, although they do of course share commonalities.  
 
The academic literature is subject to much discussion and the presentation of theoretical 
models, such as Castles
25
 using migration theory to explain how economic and sociological 
concepts can be used to understand migration flows. The Scottish Refugee Council
26
 used a 
grounded theory approach when reporting on the current state of refugee family reunion. 
From an international perspective, Boswell
27
 critiqued several theoretical models and 
positions in exploring migration. For instance, macro theory was found useful when assessing 
the forced displacement of migrants; micro theory, rational choice theory, and meso theory, 
which examines the systems and networks involved in refugee migration,
28
 provide a 
discourse for the causes of refugee movements. These theories, whilst contextualising many 
of the factors affecting migration generally and refugees specifically did not assess the effects 
of the law and administrative processes on the refugees in the UK and their family members’ 
emotional state. This is where therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ), a philosophy built upon the 






  and Perlin
32
 (among others), 
through which the emotional effects of the law could be viewed and assessed, is a most 
helpful lens through which to view existing laws and legal processes. TJ not only allows an 
assessment of the negative psychological effects experienced by refugees separated from 
their families, but also, adopting its problem-solving central theme, provides for a critical 
assessment of both the legal and non-legal processes impacting on the refugees’ experience 




2. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS – THE DEFINITION OF ANTI-THERAPEUTIC 
PROCESSES 
 
There are many aspects of the refugee family reunion system which are flawed, anti-
therapeutic and often cause dismay and distress to applicants. We have discussed many of 
these deficiencies in previous papers
34
 but to give just a few examples there is the current 
problem with the use of ‘country of origin’ information which is used as background 
materials to guide judgements on asylum decisions. It will be remembered that a refugee may 
be held as such because it is unsafe for them to reside in their home country. Such evidence 
to determine the safety of the country would derive (in part at least) from the country of 
origin documents (Country of Origin Information Report and Country Policy and Information 
Note) as used by the Home Office. As recently as 5 December 2018 the Independent Chief 
Inspector of Borders and Immigration noted in his Inspection Report that the country of 
origin information used in decision-making was frequently deficient in its qualitative depth 
and accuracy (referring to the information on Iran); the lack of speed and timeliness in which 
the situation in some countries is changing (in reference to the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC)); and an overreliance on second-hand English language  sources (in relation to 
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both the DRC and to Turkey).
35
 Indeed, the Chief Inspector noted that he sent the report to 
the Home Office in August 2018 and it took no action on the findings for four months before 
issuing him with an ‘equivocal response’ to the recommendations made.
36
 This, the Chief 
Inspector concludes, demonstrates a lack of seriousness on the part of the Home Office to 
consider the Report or the issues raised in it. 
 
This situation, however, is certainly not uncommon. In September 2018 the same Chief 
Inspector, David Bolt, criticised the Home Office for being ‘far too slow’ in acting to 
implement his ten recommendations for improvements to the refugee family reunion system 
from a 2016 report.
37
 Of the eight recommendations which had yet to be addressed, three are 
of particular significance and which cause delays to decision-making, particularly 
problematic and negative in relation to the impact on the lives of the refugees and their 
families, and/or lead, unnecessarily, to cases having to be solved in the courts. These are 1) a 
need to improve the timeliness of the decision-making of the ECO; 2) an improvement in the 
quality of decision-making, record keeping and the ECM quality assurance system and its 
refusal notices; and 3) improvements needed in the collection and interpretation of 
information relevant to the applications. 
 
Another problematic area is the increasing movement towards the requirement for, and use 
of, DNA evidence to establish the connection of the family. Refugee family reunion enables 
the parent who resides in the UK to sponsor their child to apply to join the refugee to live in 
the UK. Typically a birth certificate, as an official state document, will be presented to 
establish parentage. It may be the case that given the non-ideal circumstances through which 
the individual has become a refugee, and perhaps because such documents are not readily 
sought in the refugee’s home country, such a certificate does not exist. To circumvent this 
problem the sponsor may present DNA evidence to establish that he is the parent of the child 
applicant. Whilst this is an accessible route, and it is often valued by the ECO as it involves 
less sifting through documentary evidence to try and establish the sponsor as the applicant’s 
parent, it is not without problems. The current system of refugee family reunion embodies a 
culture of disbelieving, in the first instance, that the sponsor is the applicant's parent and 
instead requires scientific proof (and the profound negative connotations that this approach 
establishes). Where the ECO rejects an application for refugee family reunion on the basis 
that parentage cannot be established, an anti-therapeutic relationship begins. It necessitates a 
request by the applicant to their sponsor (typically the father) and their mother to undergo a 
test which may be demeaning, could call into question the fidelity of the parent’s 
relationship, and indeed may possibly result in establishing the child applicant as not being 
the biological child of the sponsor. This is potentially devastating to the family unit and may 
even expose the mother and child applicant to danger where it is established that the sponsor 
is not the biological father. It may also be questioned as to what the result may be if the 
sponsor is not the biological father of just one child. It is feasible that the sponsor is applying 
to be reunited with his spouse and children, and if one child is not biologically his, does this 
child get left behind? Does the sponsor accept the child as his and continue to raise the child 
as his own? How do the siblings react to the news that this child does not share the same 
father as them? Further, how do the siblings react to the news that the mother has had a child 
with another man – this may have been through some form of infidelity, although it is not 
uncommon in family reunion cases for the mother to have been a victim of a rape resulting in 
a pregnancy.  
 
The results of the DNA evidence are issued to those involved in the application. In fairness to 
the Home Office, whilst it is not compelled to offer sensitivity in communicating the 
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rejection of an application on this basis, it did provide direction to ECOs. Here the ECO was 
instructed to be aware that it may not be obvious whether the husband or other family 
members were aware of the true relationship of the illegitimacy of the child and that there 
could be serious repercussions for the wife and child were this information to be disclosed. In 
relation to illegitimacy, the ECO was instructed to try and establish the state of the family 
circumstances by interviewing the child's mother discreetly and with sensitivity – a reference 
to UK Visas and Immigration Department to conduct an interview with the sponsor was to be 
avoided. Further, the ECOs were told not to routinely disclose this information to the sponsor 
or other family members, yet due to the UK Data Protection laws, the sponsor and applicants 
have a right to access the personal information about themselves which is held by the Home 
Office. 
 
It is important to recognise that because the sponsor is not the biological father of the child, 
but the child has been brought up as a member of that family, will not prevent a successful 
application for family reunion. The Home Office has provided instruction to this effect to the 
ECOs reminding them that it is normally appropriate to admit the child under para. 297(i)(f) 
of the Immigration Rules. At some level this appears to be a therapeutically friendly 
approach. Applying Wexler's wine and bottle metaphor,
38
 the Immigration Rules may 
necessitate DNA evidence and access to it by the parties – which may be problematic, yet the 
application and interpretation of those Rules is an attempt to avoid the harshness and anti-
therapeutic potential therein. This is until it is recalled that the instruction just noted from the 
Home Office to ECOs was presented in 2015 and, at the time of writing, is no longer 
provided in the UK government website, nor is it presented in any current guidance. Thus, 
newly appointed ECOs or those who are looking for guidance on this matter will not find the 
instruction or be in a position to provide, necessarily, a consistent method of interpreting and 
communicating news of the legitimacy of the child. 
 
3. INFUSING A THERAPUTIC PHILOSOPHY INTO REFUGEE FAMILY 
REUNION THROUGH JUDICIAL INTERVENTION? 
 
Following the refugee’s application to be reunited with their sponsor living in the UK, it is 
assessed and then the result is communicated to the applicant. The sponsor, where this 
process has been successful, will make arrangements with their family members, often 
assisted by an organisation such as the Red Cross, for the family members to leave the 
country in which they presently reside and enter the UK to live with the sponsor. In the event 
that the application is unsuccessful, the applicant may appeal and/or make a resubmission (in 
an attempt to rectify the deficiencies in the previous application). However, there may exist a 
suspicion, often borne out of experience of users of the system, that once an ECO has 
rejected an application, further applications may be similarly (almost systematically) rejected. 
The appeal route may be the chosen method by the applicant as the case is heard in the 
Tribunal before a judge, and by appearing before a judge and being allowed to have their 
situation and circumstances explained, the client’s application may be accepted.
39
 Yet the 
legal process, following the negative experience of the first administrative stage, may not 
necessarily provide the positive and therapeutic dispute resolution forum envisaged by the 
applicant or their refugee sponsor (who often will be the party in attendance to offer 
information, explanation and evidence in the case). Evidence of proceedings of the parties 
from court cases and judicial processes is difficult to obtain due to reporting restrictions of 
those in the court room. However, anecdotal evidence from practitioners and clients obtained 
over several years has provided many examples of anti-TJ practices in immigration cases. 
This includes child applicants being subject to practices which were interpreted as bullying 
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from state-representatives. Ineffective control of courtroom procedures by the judge, 
members of the judiciary with a dismissive attitude, those who often fail to make or maintain 
eye-contact with individuals in the courtroom, judges with a passive aggressive / 
disapproving attitude to caseworkers and claimants, and ineffective legal representation of 
the client lead to a very negative experience and poor perception of access to justice. 
 
It would be wrong to suggest that all judges who hear refugee family reunion cases do so in 
an anti-therapeutic manner. Many do apply the interpersonal skills based on the psychology 
of procedural justice (a theory heavily relied upon by TJ pioneers in the context of 
therapeutic judging).
40
 Meaningful and effective interactions that form therapeutic judging 
are characterised by empathy, including relating events to the participants’ lives; 
acknowledging emotional responses to cases and events; possessing a sense of care, 
compassion and respect to enforce validation; acting in a trustworthy manner and credibly; 
and being aware of their own bias (for example in relation to appearance). The judges could 
also demonstrate respect through referring to the parties by the designation ‘sir’ or ‘madam’, 
using effective body language techniques including maintaining eye contact, listening 
carefully and attentively to the parties, they can speak slowly and ensure the parties 
(especially refugees whose understanding of English may be less strong than other parties to 
the court) understand the proceedings and the questions being asked / evidence being sought. 
The judges can speak effectively to the parties, refraining from the use of paternalistic tones, 
sarcasm and by not interrupting the answers given by the refugee or rushing them through a 
response. This also involves an acceptance, and the exercise of active listening and an 
appreciation of the judge’s non-verbal forms of communication. Matters as simple as whether 
the judge looks interested in the responses of the refugee, their tone of voice and whether 
they take notes during evidence giving to demonstrate interest and listening can have 
significantly positive effects on the administration of justice.  
 
Finally, the judge can enter into a conversation with the refugee and Home Office 
representative. Here the First-tier Tribunal (which hears all cases relating to immigration and 
asylum matters, including deportation cases) would adapt to a more problem-solving court 
approach, as advocated by Goldberg
41
 whereby rather than the traditional feature of the 
courts resolving legal disputes (such as whether the ECO had correctly applied the 
procedures for determining whether to accept or decline the application for family reunion), 
they would instead have the goal of resolving the underlying problem of why the application 
failed, the system of a re-application or an appropriately explained reason for refusal letter 
had not been communicated with the parties. We have argued elsewhere the positive 
examples from the judiciary who attempt to use their powers of interpretation and 
interactions with court personnel and litigants to minimise the negative effects of the law and 
legal process. This we referred to as ‘judicial Canutism’.
42
 However, this is not a policy 
adopted by all members of the judiciary and it would be concerning if it were left to the 
sensibilities of the judiciary to mitigate against the defects in the legal system and the policies 
which underpin its development. 
 
The nature of refugee family reunion is based on the assessment and application of legal 
principles, but if this legal outcome is the focus, the therapeutic outcome may be lost. To 
deny an applicant the most fundamental right to reside with their family should be a decision 
taken with the upmost seriousness and only be denied in circumstances where the applicant 
has not been able to demonstrate the family ties. The significance of the removal of legal aid 
in England and Wales to refugees seeking reunification has been profound. The result was the 




 lead to the establishment in their place of university run law 
clinics
44
 and, of greater concern, the advent of unregulated services which charged fees with 
no control over the quality or correctness of the help provided to the client. This resulted in 
access to necessary assistance for the sponsor/applicant(s) being impractical. This Act also 
had a direct and anti-therapeutic implications for DNA testing. Not infrequently, the sponsor 
in the UK has to use DNA evidence to establish the family relationship, yet the evidence 
accepted by the Home Office (through the ECO) has to be from a list of approved 
immigration DNA suppliers (since 2014 the Home Office ceased DNA testing (and paying 
for these tests)). These suppliers typically charge approximately £800 for the test (Briefing 
Paper on Refugee Family Reunion – GMIAU
45
 which can, obviously, involve more than one 
child) and will have to be paid by the sponsor/applicants unless a successful Exceptional 
Case Funding application is made (which have fallen significantly following the removal of 
the Home Office paying for testing). For instance, Bolt
46
 reports the increases of refusals of 
family reunion applications between 2013 and 2015 to be from 15% to 46% for Eritrean 
applicants; 17% to 80% for Somalian applicants and from 9% to 34%, 35% and 36% for 




The consequence is that many sponsors are denied the right to be reunited with their families 
because of the application of rules without an effective means of reviewing the decision. 
Judges can assist in these circumstances not by changing the rules under which they have to 
operate as this would extend the doctrine of statutory interpretation beyond the limits as 
permitted even via a purposive or teleological approach. A therapeutic approach must occur 
within the constraints of the legal system. Rather the judges may act as a facilitator for 
collaboration between the parties, to encourage participants and stakeholders to work in 
establishing the remediation of underlying problems, and to adopt a commonsensical rather 
than legalistic approach to the resolution of the problem. TJ recognises that legal processes 
will have an impact in any event, and that the impact can be harnessed to achieve a positive 
outcome.
48
 Therapeutic outcomes should be sought so that they do not undermine standards 




The inconsistency of approach by the judiciary in cases involving refugees, and evidence of a 
lack of appreciation of the problems experienced by refugees and how these may manifest 
themselves in terms of, for example, testimony in court proceedings, remains. In a case heard 
by the Court of Appeal (R(PA)(Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department)
50
 it was 
held that adverse findings made by the First-tier Tribunal judge (who considered the refugee 
as having ‘cynically manipulated’ the legal system and the use of medical evidence accepted 
in court) would not be displaced merely because the judge did not have the benefit of 
knowledge that the refugee was suffering from cognitive impairment as proven through 
psychiatric and psychological evidence. Further issues here which are troubling is that the 
case involved a Kurdish child and one who had been smuggling goods including alcohol 
across the Iran boarder with Iraq. Despite evidence being presented as to the commonplace 
nature of this situation, and the use of protection rackets to commandeer participants, the 
Tribunal accepted the Home Office Country Information Reports as being more authoritative 
than such in-country expertise on the political and pragmatic nature of operations. A 
postscriptum in the case remarked on the overly long judgments from First-tier Tribunals 
which also contain unnecessary detail. These, it continues, cause problems with consistency 
and cogency. This is compounded by the First-tier Tribunal which conducts many cases as 







 have identified interactional principles that should be 
adopted by the judiciary when providing a TJ compliant approach. These include acceptance, 
empathy, empowerment, hope and expectancy, a future focus, self-expression, warmth and 
respect. In Goldberg’s
53
 judicial training manual, active listening, a positive focus, non-
coercion, non-paternalism, and clarity were additional features for incorporation. Of course, 
these are aspirational qualities and indeed, as noted by Perlin,
54
 the charisma of the judge is 
essential in the running of a case and its outcome. Despite such aims, this does not prevent 
problems occurring such as the misapplication of procedural rules and its anti-TJ effects. For 
example, in R (Help Refugees) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
55
 and R 
(Citizens UK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
56
 the government’s 
implementation of Immigration Act 2016 s. 67 (referred to as the “Dubs amendment”)
57
 was 
found to be in breach of the common law duty of procedural fairness. It failed to provide 
adequate reasons to affected unaccompanied asylum seeking children who were rejected for 
transfer to the UK through s. 67. 
 
These points are presented here to demonstrate a number of problems with the current 
judicial system involving refugees and how a different approach is needed to avoid some of 
the worst examples of poor practice and unhelpful determinacy in cases of the upmost 
importance – reuniting families and respect for family life as a human right. 
 
4. THE ANTI-TJ EFFECTS OF THE LAW… 
 
At present, a refugee sponsor and his family applicants who find the application fails in some 
way is informed of this through a letter from the ECO (as agreed by the ECM). In reality, 
many of these read as though copy and pasted from a template and frequently they are written 
in accusatory language and without definitive instruction as to what the applicant may do to 
rectify the defects. For example, in a case of which the authors have experience, a client was 
refused family reunion. As part of his family’s application, in the absence of a birth 
certificate, the applicant included a Baptismal Certificate. The response from the ECO was 
‘… this is not an official record of your birth… it is therefore of no evidential value as 
evidence that you are related as stated to your sponsor.’ Further in the letter was reference to 
a photograph included to demonstrate the pre-family ties between the sponsor and the 
applicant. Again, the response from the ECO was ‘I am unable to identify either you or your 
sponsor in this picture and as such I am not satisfied that you have ever met your sponsor in 
person’ (authors’ emphasis). The letter of refusal concludes ‘… I am not satisfied that you 
are the child of a parent who currently has refugee status granted under the Immigration 
Rules in the UK or that you were part of the family unit of a person granted asylum…’ It is 
important to recall at this point that this letter is drafted to a child and one which is living 
away from the person (that they at least) consider to be their father. It is understandable how 
a civil servant needs to consider the evidence supporting an application. They may also 
reasonably conclude that such evidence is inconclusive or is not acceptable to support 
evidence of the family connection. However it is in the wording of the response, the 
allegation of deception about the family connection, the lack of engagement with the 
applicant about the evidence or what evidence is required to satisfy the test for family reunion 
which makes the rejection so unfair, negative and anti-therapeutic. 
 
There is also little opportunity to effectively challenge the decision in a conversation with the 
ECO, and the refugee’s family are faced with a choice. They may accept the decision and live 
apart (or the family may attempt to make the journey to the UK and claim asylum in their 
own right). They may make a re-submission of the original application and try to remedy the 
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defects so as to satisfy the ECO as to the veracity of the documentary evidence submitted 
along with their application. They may submit a ‘fresh’ application and seek guidance to 
improve on the first submission and hope a different ECO may conclude differently from that 
of the ECO in the first application. Finally, the applicants may choose to appeal the decision 
of the ECO and have this challenge heard by a judge (in the First-tier Tribunal). Litigation, 
then, is the only real option in which to have the decision of the ECO challenged by an 
independent adjudicator. This form of dispute resolution is not necessarily the most effective, 
impartial and effective means of resolving disputes in refugee family reunion cases (as noted 
above). However, at present and in relation to refugee family reunion, alternative forms of 
dispute resolution are not available. 
 
The training of judges in the UK is of a high standard and is likely comparable to those 
around the world. There is instruction to them on helping litigants and particularly litigants in 
person (those not legally represented at hearings). Of course, whilst mindful of the needs of 
all litigants, the judges are not permitted to assist the litigant to make legal arguments or on 
how to ensure documents to be relied upon have been submitted correctly. Further, there is 
anecdotal evidence of judges, as noted above, acting in anti-therapeutic ways when dealing 
with cases involving refugees. This exists, not only in the UK (see Marson, Ferris and 
Kawalek);
58





In recent research, judges in the UK’s only ‘drug court’ were found to be acting in a largely 
therapeutic way (at least to the best of their abilities), but this was in the context of laws and 
methods of operating which were not conducive to a TJ-compliant philosophy.
60
 It replicated 
effectively the distinction between Wexler’s ‘wine’ and ‘bottle’ metaphor
61
 where the 
judiciary were attempting, of their own volition, to minimise the harmful effects of the UK’s 
laws when dealing with individuals facing criminal charges due to their relationship with, and 
use of, illegal drugs.
62
 Therefore, whilst it is undeniable that individual and even groups of 
like-minded judges will share information and act in a TJ friendly manner, this is not 
widespread practice and TJ principles are not fully included in the training received by a 
lawyer or judge. 
 
5. …AND TACTICS THAT CAN BE ADOPTED TO MITIGATE AGAINST THESE 
 
As noted, the communications between the refugee applicant, the sponsor and the Home 
Office are often fraught with negativity and the use of accusatory language. The sponsor is 
preparing for their new life in a new country and to do this successfully, they should be 
joined by their existing family members. Unless there is a good reason, the overriding 
principle should be on the Home Office assisting the sponsor and applicant(s) to establish 
their right to reunification, not to adopt a position of distrust and obfuscation as to defects in 
thee application. Thus, what current activities should the Home Office avoid in adopting a 
TJ-compliant philosophy? Do not disregard the negative emotional consequences of a refusal 
letter to the sponsor and applicant(s). The refusal might be necessary, and the application 
may be deficient which means it is not possible to enable the reunification of the family at 
this time. Yet these are people, they have vulnerabilities and may be experiencing a number 
of emotional issues, and the deficiencies in the application and bundle of supporting evidence 
may be due to the results of the sponsor’s mental health, their non-ideal travel to the UK, 
their lack of English language skills, their lack of experience of completing government 
application forms and so on.
63
 A reasons for refusal letter should be constructive, supportive 
and helpful for the sponsor and applicant(s) to remedy the defects in the application or to, 
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gently and with compassion and empathy, explain why the law currently does not allow the 
family to be reunited. For the sake of the future relationship between the sponsor and their 
new home country (embodied here in the form of the state authority), the typical refusal letter 
should be changed so as not to possibly destroy future cooperation and effective integration 
of the sponsor in the UK. Secondly, the ECO and ECM should not assume the worst of the 
sponsor and applicant and conclude that errors or defects in the application are due to 
mistruths. Applications can be flawed due, for example, to the paucity of contemporaneous 
supporting evidence, the applicant providing the information (answers) they think the state 
(Home Office) wants to hear and in so doing having manufactured evidence to ‘fill in the 
gaps’ in their prior or subsisting relationship with the sponsor, or they may not wish for the 
sponsor/applicant to have knowledge that a child is not the biological descendant of their 
sponsor. A third point is for the ECO/ECM to work in concert with the applicant(s) and 
sponsor to avoid court proceedings through communication. Engaging in dialogue with the 
applicant(s)/sponsor can resolve many of the issues which cause the applications to fail, it can 
(often easily) resolve the misunderstandings or problems in the application or in the way 
supporting materials are presented, and it can stop any potential (and unnecessary) appeals 
being lodged through a discussion as to why national rules preclude the family’s 
reunification. 
 
Ultimately, once lawyers and courts become involved in the process, it is taken out of the 
control of the parties and matters are determined by a judge. The parties can no longer, and 
with certainty, determine issues or resolve their differences but require an independent third 
party to do this for them. One way of preventing this course of action and a way in which 
they can be encouraged to work cooperatively together is through the adoption of mediation. 
Through mediation the parties are no longer adversaries seeking to ‘win’ their case against 
the opposing side. For family reunion, the consequences are too great and fundamental to be 
reduced to winning or losing a legal or, more frequently, a factual argument. Neither does the 
applicant(s)/sponsor wish for the matter to be reduced to a factual or legal argument made to 
a judge. The sponsor/applicant(s) enter the legal process as a last resort and typically will 
exhibit fear and mistrust of authorities (often stemming from their experience in them 
becoming refugees). They may be aware that the UK’s legal system is adversarial, and they 
are challenging the state’s decision to be reunited with their family, and therefore they are 
adversaries in court/tribunal. Adversarial systems do not tend to promote cooperation 
between the parties. The parties are deemed to pursue their own interests in a single-minded 
manner, and they do not have to consider the effect of their conduct on the other party. Thus, 
it can be seen with the refusal letter to the applicant(s)/sponsor; the general lack of 
engagement with the applicant(s) about deficiencies in the application which led to the 
refusal; the Home Office defending an appeal against such a decision; perhaps not attending 
the hearing to defend its decision (without informing the applicant(s); and with the Home 
Office appealing a decision of the court even where it has not attended the initial hearing to 
present and defend its decision-making. 
 
The above points will be true to a greater or lesser extent depending on the handling of the 
case by the parties, the members of the court and the judge in charge of proceedings. As we 
have spoken of previously,
64
 the judge can have a meaningful influence on these issues and 
with careful case management may reduce the anti-therapeutic aspects of the court hearing. 
The parties can be reassured from the outset that they are not adversaries and that the case is 
needed to identify the contentious points and to help determine the issues. Most appeals 
regarding refugee family reunion are based on factual issues rather than legal argument. 
Thus, it is more common for the cases to be determined on their facts rather than in the 
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application or establishing of doctrine. A TJ approach can be infused into the existing refugee 
family reunion process. The parties can be encouraged to work cooperatively, and empathy 
and respect can be shown to the applicant(s) being represented by the sponsor in the hearing. 
A support mechanism, interpreters who are specifically trained for family reunion cases and 
can communicate nuanced and detailed facts with clarity, and court personnel who recognise 
the fear of the applicant(s)/sponsor – fear of not being reunited with their family, fear of 
letting down their family members living abroad, fear of the unknown in a future living in a 
new country without their friends and wider family members. These approaches can mitigate 
against the worst negative effects of the law, but it does not alter the fact that cases in court 
are based on litigation. TJ, in the alternative, is based on problem-solving and by establishing 
a system for the parties to meet, outside of a court setting, and for dialogue and conversations 
to resolve discrepancies in the application, a more therapeutic system will be the result. This, 
we propose, might be achieved through the introduction of mediation. 
 
6. MEDIATION AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
 
Therefore, there must be a movement away from litigation as a mechanism to resolve the 
dispute between the sponsor, their applicant family members and the Home Office which has 
refused the application for those family members to join their sponsor in the UK. There has 
not been, thus far, such a movement, as seen internationally in relation to family courts in the 
US, of a shifting philosophy to creative, supportive, collaborative and interest-based dispute 
resolution processes.
65
 Further, the gamut of forms of mediation available have not yet 
surfaced in relation to disputes of this nature, such as psycho-educational programs; non-





 and cooperative negotiation agreements.
68
 Thus, significant limitations apply to the 
forms that resolution of disputes here may take, despite the very broad nature and complexity 
present in the cases. Importantly, the services noted above are available through the court 
services and thus would not incorporate the costs and difficulties that may be present where 
dispute resolution mechanisms are administered through private organisations. 
 
What is needed in the UK is a system of adjudicating refugee family reunion disputes which 
adopts a new way of thinking about the resolution of problems of applications. An 
appreciation of the non-ideal circumstances refugees find themselves in when travelling to 
the UK and that their families may lack coherent documents regarding parentage, marriages 
and contacts. It has always seemed somewhat incredulous that the ECO will accept a record 
of telephone communications from a mobile telephone number associated with the sponsor 
and a second number associated with the family member (spouse and/or child) without any 
details of the nature of the calls or indeed whether they are genuinely linked to the persons 
claimed. However, they will often find fault with, and thereby reject the veracity of, 
documents which may have been defaced (a birth certificate may have been written on by the 
applicant when an administrative error has been identified after the issue of it and they have 
sought fit to provide a correction), or those issued for the purposes of an application (such as 
producing a birth certificate of a child which had, previous to the application for family 
reunion, been unnecessary and is not as ubiquitous a document as may be the case in Western 
jurisdictions) which are subsequently held as non-contemporaneous. Where an ECO is faced 
with non-contemporaneous documents they frequently conclude that these are of ‘little 
evidential evidence’ and necessitate a fresh application which supplements this with DNA 
evidence.
69
 These problems are systemic and enable the rejection of applications without an 
examination of the underlying problems of why the issue has led to a challenge in the courts. 
There is a lack of mutual interest in examining the problems within an application and 
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understanding how the applicant and the ECO working collaboratively could resolve these. It 
would further be helpful for the parties to move away from the adversarial system entrenched 
in the UK legal system, one which has been engrained in students who then become lawyers 
and ultimately progress to sit as a judge. It is understandable how, when the applicants, 
through the refugee sponsor, appoint a lawyer to fight their case against the ECO who, 
through the Home Office, appoints their lawyers to argue the decision was correctly made, 
problems in the system remain. The lawyers trained in the English adversarial system of law 
will battle on the points of law with the aim to win, to push their advantages regardless of the 
negative effects on the opposing party.
70
 A movement to problem-solving and collaboration 
is needed. As explained by Edwards
71
 when referring to family cases of divorce, there lies  
 
‘the harm that engaging in adversarial tactics can bring—harm in the use of cross-
examination on vulnerable
72
 witnesses, in the expense of engaging in prolonged 
discovery, and the ultimate harm created when there are winners and losers in each 




Of course, mediation as a dispute resolution tool has been subject to critical appraisal and is 




 for instance, identified the trajectory in 
the US of mediation to a new form of arbitration (referred to as ‘legal mediation’) which 
facilitated the development of ‘… aggressive behaviors of lawyers as mediation advocates, 
operating in a weak ethical regime that permits some forms of deception…’
76
 Here the 
lawyers consider the mediation process to be one of a private judicial settlement conference 




Mediation is not being suggested to enable applicants to avoid the scrutiny of the legal 
system. Nor is it presented as a means to circumvent the application of strict rules on family 
reunion. Rather it empowers parties to hear each other’s arguments,
78
 to engage in a 
conversation where issues may be explored and solutions considered. It removes the 
powerlessness felt by many refugee sponsors, typically male (in the case of fleeing war or 
when the family face persecution the male is often the strongest and most able to reach a safe 
country and then send for the family to join him) and the patriarch of the family who is 
unable to unilaterally provide for the reunification of the family. It allows for the Home 
Office to explain in greater depth why an application has to fail but perhaps explore methods 
of ensuring the safety of the family living abroad and provide reference to services to help the 
refugee manage the transition to acceptance of the decision. This mechanism may also help to 
integrate the needs of the family more sensitively than a ruling issued by a judge and based 
on arguments having been orchestrated by the team of lawyers involved. The refugee sponsor 
would be placed at the heart of the process and the resolution of the dispute rather than a 
largely passive bystander awaiting the decision from a process many will not understand. 
They may also be better able to accept the decision made as their needs and interests have 
been a central component of the process. They will feel better able to explain this to their 
rejected family members, who cannot join them in the UK, and be able to begin a 
conversation with them about the defects in the application and what happens next in their 
lives. Integration is a matter which is often overlooked when dealing with the 
sponsor/applicant(s) on the basis of the legal issues surrounding their application for 
reunification. However, as noted by the Refugee Council and Oxfam, prolonged separation 
from their family not only ‘dominates the lives’ of the sponsor in the UK, but it is easier to 





Arguments have been presented regarding the use of mediation in legal (and non-legal) 
settings. Mediation is not currently used in refugee family reunion cases and thus we are 
envisioning how the current problems existing in the process could be removed or at least 
reduced through the adoption of mediation as a dispute resolution technique. In so doing, we 
can look to mediation’s use in family proceedings as a model which impacts the emotional 
state of potentially vulnerable litigants,
80
 being replicated in a similarly emotional, personal 
and family-orientated system as occurs in refugee family reunion. The characteristics in 
family law chime with the refugee clients seeking reunification with their family members 
and therefore parallels may be drawn from the findings of previous research with families 
using mediation. According to Beck and Sales,
81
 mediation provides benefits for both 
litigants and the legal system generally. It is of course trite comment to say that the power 
relationship that currently exists between the Home Office and the refugee and their family 
member applicants is heavily in favour of the Home Office. The UK government (here in the 
guise of the Home Office) establishes the rules (legislative and administrative) that determine 
whether reunification may be granted. It also is the body which determines whether these 
rules have been satisfied. Thus, the refugees and the applicant family members may find 
themselves in a very unevenly matched battle with only an adversarial court system (which 
too may be inaccessible due to costs and other practical issues) to provide a forum for 
discussion about the problems inherent in their application and what might be done to explain 
these. For the refugee sponsors who are seeking to be reunited in their new ‘home’ country 
with their families (who are often living abroad), mediation may benefit the claimant/litigant 
through empowerment and self-determination.
82
 This is manifested in the mediator who has 
the ability to help the parties (the refugee and the Home Office) to reach a cooperative 
solution to the dispute. Hence, if the concern of the Home Office relates to the 
contemporaneous nature of the documentation presented by the refugee claimant of their 
relationship with their sponsor, mediation could enable the refugee to take control of this 
problem, ascertain exactly what is needed and present this for the satisfaction of the Home 
Office representative (and thereby enable a conversation to be initiated which allows more 
effective communication between the parties than currently exists). Or, in the absence of this 
material, evidence on the country of origin and the reason for the non-existence of such 
material could be explored along with the expert and independent verification of these 
explanations which may lead to a thorough examination of the matter to be concluded.
83
 The 
value of the ability for the airing of grievances, which is not readily enabled in court 
proceedings, and for each side to communicate and for thorough explanations to be issued 
and discussed is invaluable to remove the sense of unfairness that currently exists when an 
application for refugee family reunion is refused. Where the reunion application must fail, 
perhaps for failures due to policy or the application of the law, given the nature of the 
communication avenues available this can be explained to the refugee sponsor more 
effectively than through a letter or court case and this in turn is more likely to lead to 
acceptance, compliance and will limit the psychological damage that may accompany an 
unexplained decision which will otherwise be perceived as being unfair. And, evidently, 
mediation is a far less adversarial environment than a court case – being litigated by 
advocates which removes the control from the refugee, may lead to arguments being 
presented which the refugee does not understand or which they would not raise, and could 
further lead to information which they feel is relevant (but which may not be part of the legal 
issue in question) being not presented. This again, cumulatively, instils a negative and anti-
therapeutic feeling to the legal and administrative process of refugee family reunion. 
 
Mediation may also be a benefit for the Home Office, the ECO and ECM which, if engaged 
with in a positive spirit, could lend itself to significant learning opportunities. Whilst locally 
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based ECO’s and ECM’s will have experience of some cultural issues affecting applicants 
and may appreciate the nuances of claims before them, there is a possibility that without 
engaging on a personal basis with the applicant that such matters become merely procedural. 
It can be quite easy for administrators to follow rules and apply them without the full 
consideration of an individual’s circumstances and reasons why there may be problems with 
what they have included or omitted in an application or bundle of evidence. Coupled with 
regular debriefings amongst local, national and internationally based staff, the ECM’s could 
collate case studies, share evidence of good practice and generally create a positive refugee 
family reunion system with benefits for all. Further, if this could be coupled with an holistic 
and multi-disciplinary methodology where other parties, here it would include counsellors, 
local advisors, country experts, lawyers practicing in the area, interpreters (ensuring, for 
instance, on appropriate quality levels), doctors, members of relevant charity sectors, and 
local authority representatives,
84
 could feed into the training and resultant evidence following 
mediation, there would be a system which could feed into changes in the law itself and in its 
application.
85
 The very complex system of refugee family reunion, based as it is on highly 
charged emotions in non-ideal circumstances, could be reformed through mediation. As with 
the properly conducted application system run by, for instance, university law clinics, 
avoiding paternalistic tendencies and enabling the refugee sponsor to help their family 
members through the application process empowers such sponsors. They remain in charge of 
their destiny (to some extent at least) and can work towards resolving disputes which are 
visible and clear (through the direction and help of those legally and non-legally qualified 
advisors helping them). This problem-solving approach lends itself to the next level of 
dispute resolution in mediation where, again, faced with difficulties the sponsor and 
applicant(s) family members can feel part of resolving their own disputes, to become 
cooperative members of this process, and to make use of the support systems available and 
mentioned above to help establish a future for them and their families. Each party in the 
process, the sponsor/applicant(s) and the ECO/ECM would take personal responsibility for 
their actions, their decisions and how to resolve the situation until its conclusion. 
 
In respect of the benefits for the legal system, by removing refugee family reunion claims 
from a legal setting presided by a judge to mediation, where the mediator might be a mental 
health professional or someone specialising in conflict and dispute resolution techniques, 
many of the potential anti-therapeutic effects of the traditional dispute resolution system can 
be avoided. Further, and a benefit often attributed to all forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, is the speed and inexpensive nature of mediation over the court system. Many 
months are likely to pass between the applicant being refused their reunification with the 
refugee sponsor and the appeal to this decision being heard in the Tribunal (and once legal 
aid
86
 or pro bono legal representation has been secured). Mediation removes this tier and 
allows the parties to determine issues and reach a resolution far quicker – and generally with 
less need for lawyers.
87
 Terms such as claimant/appellant and defendant/respondent would be 
removed from the lexicon of family reunion claims. Instead, they would be replaced by 
names, humanising the refugee/applicant(s) and re-establishing the nature of what is at stake 
– a new life for a refugee in a safe home from where they will, along with their families, 






The reunion of the family is a central component in a refugee creating a new life following 
the trauma associated with refugee status. The current administrative requirements of the 
application procedure may place substantial barriers to successful reunification. The online 
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process requires technical know-how and a relatively high proficiency in English to be able 
to successfully navigate through the system. Many applicants lack these skills. Where 
applications fail, the applicant is faced with submitting a revised or fresh claim (of which 
many are unsuccessful) or a legal challenge may be made. The legal process is fraught with 
hurdles for the applicant and the possibilities of a lack of understanding of the decision, a 
sense of helplessness for the applicant, and an arrangement where the applicant is challenging 
the state through an adversarial system. Despite the best efforts of some therapeutically-
minded judges, the practice and the rules under which decisions are made is not conducive to 
resolving the underlying problems in the administration of refugee family reunion. They are 
about the correct application of a set of broken rules. Mediation could enable the 
engagement, problem-solving, and collaborative approach which would help to establish 
genuine and deserving cases. It would also reduce the burden on an already stretched judicial 
process trying to deal with the consequences of an increased rate of refused applications and 
the legal appeals this brings. Alternative forms of dispute resolution must be brought into 
effect to stop the deep-seated anti-therapeutic effects experienced in applications for refugee 
family reunion. 
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